Evan Sankey
Following days of rumors, China’s government announced on January 24 that General Zhang Youxia, the most senior People’s Liberation Army (PLA) commander below President Xi Jinping, and General Liu Zhenli, the head of China’s Joint Staff Department, are under investigation for “serious discipline and law violations.” The move is the latest in a years-long series of investigations that have ended the careers of dozens of senior officers, including five members of the Communist Party’s Central Military Commission (CMC), China’s highest military leadership body.
The normally seven-person CMC is now reduced to two, including President Xi. And the removal of Zhang and Liu now means that no one in China’s military leadership has any past combat experience.
The motivations are probably mixed. Zhang had close ties to China’s military procurement apparatus, which has been the subject of corruption investigations that have brought down other PLA leaders. Zhang was considered safe because he and Xi were friends, and their fathers had fought together in the Chinese Civil War. The decisive factor was almost certainly political. The PLA’s official newspaper accuses Zhang and Liu of having “severely trampled on and undermined” Xi’s command over the military, suggesting they either moved against Xi or that Xi perceived they might.
Xi’s hold on power is strengthened for now, but it is undoubtedly a reputational problem that the PLA leadership is in disarray 13 years into his tenure as party chairman. Continuing political instability could complicate his drive to secure a fourth term as party chairman at the 21st Party Congress in late 2027. It may also condition how Xi ultimately leaves office.
Leaders of China hold three titles (party chairman, CMC chairman, and president) and sometimes stagger the succession. If Xi perceives the PLA requires his extended attention, or if he wants to maintain sway over his successor, he may hold onto the CMC chairmanship even after he ceases to be president.
The US foreign policy establishment fixates on 2027 as a potential deadline in China’s timetable for forceful reunification of Taiwan. That belief, based on a misreading of U.S. intelligence assertions that Xi has instructed his forces to be ready by 2027, should now be in even deeper disrepute. The CMC vacancies may not be filled until the Party Congress in 2027, and Zhang and Liu’s removal will likely trigger the purge of more junior officers perceived as their loyalists. Their replacements will be more loyal to Xi but also less experienced.
Other things being equal, this turmoil lowers the probability that Xi will feel confident enough to launch a risky invasion of Taiwan. As long as US policy remains steady and avoids pushing the envelope on expanding ties with Taiwan, the risk of conflict will recede for a while.