On December 23–24, 2024, President Zelenskyy unveiled a revised 20-point peace framework intended to end the Ukraine war through security guarantees, territorial arrangements, and economic reconstruction.
The proposal evolved from an earlier 28-point U.S.-Russian draft that Ukraine viewed as a de facto capitulation and was reshaped through negotiations with the United States, led by envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, and European partners.
The plan would be implemented under a Trump-chaired Peace Council, with violations triggering sanctions. Its core feature, U.S.-backed security guarantees, raises serious constitutional questions related to congressional war powers.
The agreement’s viability also depends entirely on Russian compliance, leaving enforcement uncertain despite the oversight mechanisms outlined in the framework. Given Moscow’s record of violating prior agreements, that assumption is tenuous. Several provisions are likely to be rejected outright by Russia, while others are effectively impossible.
Under the plan, Ukraine would maintain an 800,000-strong peacetime military. This is achievable and likely acceptable to Russia. Ukraine already fields forces of this size during wartime, making peacetime maintenance feasible with Western financial support for salaries and equipment. Russia may tolerate this arrangement because it is far less threatening than NATO membership and allows Ukraine to defend itself without posing an offensive threat to Russian territory.
The plan also calls for Article 5-style defense commitments from the United States and European partners, a provision that is constitutionally impossible for the United States. Under Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, only Congress can declare war, making any executive agreement that automatically commits U.S. forces unenforceable and likely unconstitutional. This same issue doomed Senate ratification of the Versailles Treaty in 1919, when lawmakers refused to cede war-making authority to the League of Nations.
The draft’s deliberately vague language, including phrases such as “may include” armed force and measures the president “will determine,” reflects an acknowledgment that binding automatic defense commitments cannot be made. Russia would also reject this provision outright, viewing it as NATO expansion under another name and an existential threat requiring a military response.
The $800 billion in reconstruction funding Kyiv seeks is achievable. Financing could come through a framework involving the United States, the World Bank, and seized Russian assets. As long as political will exists, funding itself is not the primary obstacle.
EU membership, however, cannot be guaranteed by any peace agreement. Accession requires unanimous approval from all 27 member states and typically takes a decade or more of reforms and negotiations. Countries such as Hungary and Slovakia could block Ukraine’s membership indefinitely for political reasons, placing EU accession entirely outside Kyiv’s control. Russia would oppose EU membership as strongly as NATO membership, viewing it as Western integration that threatens Russian influence.
An immediate ceasefire with the current front lines serving as de facto boundaries is also proposed. While practically achievable, this is politically unacceptable to both sides. Ukraine would cede roughly 20 percent of its territory, including economically vital areas of the Donbas, while Russia would abandon its stated goal of fully controlling Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. Ukraine views the arrangement as rewarding aggression, while Russia sees it as an incomplete victory.
A requirement that Russia withdraw from occupied areas in four oblasts—Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolaiv, Sumy, and Kharkiv, is militarily possible but politically implausible. Such withdrawals would return Russian forces roughly to the February 2022 front lines.
Russia has no strategic incentive to relinquish territory without compensation, and Putin cannot politically survive appearing to lose land Russia currently controls. Moscow would likely demand that Ukraine withdraw from Russian-occupied areas of Donetsk as a precondition, creating an immediate impasse.
The plan also relies on sanctions enforcement. While monitoring is feasible, sanctions are not automatic in practice. They require sustained political will across multiple governments. Europe has already shown signs of sanctions fatigue, and future U.S. administrations may prioritize other interests. Russia has demonstrated its ability to adapt to sanctions regimes, and there is no mechanism to compel enforcement if political support erodes.
The United States proposed a compromise involving a “free economic zone,” but Zelenskyy insists any territorial concession requires a referendum. Ukraine maintains that it will not recognize Donbas as Russian, either de jure or de facto.
The agreement would also bar Ukraine from using force to reclaim conceded territory, even if Russia violates other terms. Meanwhile, the future of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant remains unresolved. Ukraine favors joint operation with the United States, while Washington initially proposed trilateral management including Russia.
Moscow has been briefed on the draft and is formulating its response. The Kremlin has rejected claims of a “breakthrough” and maintains its demand that Ukraine cede territory in the Donbas. This single issue creates an impasse that renders the entire peace agreement impossible and reduces further discussion to an academic exercise.
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