President Trump has designated the Nicolás Maduro regime as a Foreign Terrorist Organization and ordered a total blockade of oil tankers entering or leaving Venezuela. This designation, typically reserved for non-state actors such as ISIS or al-Qaeda, is extraordinary when applied to a sovereign government. It triggers sanctions, criminalizes material support, exposes foreign firms to legal liability, and aims to isolate the Maduro regime from the global financial system.
A peacetime naval blockade of a sovereign nation is legally complex under international law. The administration is framing its actions as sanctions enforcement rather than a traditional act of war, a distinction that matters for legal justification and for how third parties may respond.
This distinction is especially relevant given that China and Russia hold major investments in Venezuelan oil infrastructure and debt. How those states interpret tanker seizures and interdictions could determine whether this remains an enforcement campaign or escalates into a broader geopolitical confrontation.
The administration has confirmed the seizure of an oil tanker, the Skipper, off the Venezuelan coast, describing it as part of a shadow fleet used to move sanctioned oil from Venezuela, Iran, and Russia. These vessels allegedly evade sanctions by disguising ownership through shell companies, manipulating AIS transponders, conducting ship-to-ship transfers in international waters, and routing payments through non-U.S. financial systems.
Officials said the Skipper was carrying up to 1.8 million barrels of oil and that the seizure was conducted under sanctions enforcement authorities. Attorney General Pam Bondi stated that the vessel was used to transport sanctioned oil in violation of U.S. law.
The estimated cargo value of $60 million to $100 million implies crude prices of roughly $33 to $55 per barrel. That range suggests either heavily discounted sanctioned oil or a conservative valuation used for legal and enforcement purposes. In either case, the seizure targets Venezuela’s primary sanctions-evasion mechanism rather than routine commercial shipping.
These actions are part of a broader pressure campaign that also includes U.S. military strikes on suspected drug-trafficking boats operating near Venezuela. At least 22 such strikes have been reported since September. These are kinetic military actions conducted without a declared war, raising questions about rules of engagement, target verification, civilian risk, and the distinction between international waters and territorial seas. They also test the limits of Venezuela’s military response capabilities and the likelihood of escalation.
President Trump has justified lethal drug-boat interdictions under several legal frameworks. The administration’s legal foundation rests heavily on designating major drug cartels as Foreign Terrorist Organizations. Trump has also invoked Article II constitutional authority, arguing that he is acting under his powers as Commander-in-Chief. Republicans in Congress, including Senator Lindsey Graham, have defended this position, asserting that Trump “has all the authority in the world” to order such strikes.
Trump has repeatedly framed drug trafficking as a direct national security threat that justifies military self-defense. His most explicit statement came on October 22, 2025, when he said, “We have legal authority. We’re allowed to do that.
They killed 300,000 people last year. Drugs, these drugs coming in. They killed 300,000 Americans last year, and that gives you legal authority.” Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth echoed this rationale, stating, “We have the absolute and complete authority to conduct that. First of all, just the defense of the American people alone.”
President Trump has also linked the policy to immigration enforcement, stating that criminals sent to the United States during the Biden administration are now being rapidly returned to Venezuela. He is largely referring to members of Tren de Aragua, the Venezuelan gang that made headlines in 2024 after taking over apartment complexes in Aurora, Colorado.
Both the Chávez and Maduro regimes had long refused to accept U.S. deportees, effectively blocking removals. That position has now changed, with Nicolás Maduro reversing course and allowing deportation flights to resume. In 2025 alone, more than 13,000 Venezuelans have been deported back to Venezuela.
Twice-weekly flights are operating from Phoenix, Arizona, to Maiquetía International Airport near Caracas, using either a U.S. government contractor or Venezuela’s state-owned airline. The most recent flight arrived on December 6, 2025.
Strategically, Trump’s pressure campaign is intended to disrupt illicit oil sales and narcotics trafficking while depriving the Maduro regime of critical revenue. Venezuela’s oil production has already collapsed from more than 3 million barrels per day at its pre-Chávez peak to roughly 700,000 to 900,000 barrels per day today.
The country is economically devastated. Even a complete collapse, which would be catastrophic for the population, would likely not motivate Maduro to concede to President Trump. He would cling to power despite the suffering of his people.
The administration argues that these measures are lawful, targeted, and necessary to protect U.S. interests against a hostile and criminal regime. Whether the blockade achieves regime change or merely deepens Venezuela’s collapse remains an open question.
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