Mali is facing the risk of state collapse as al-Qaida–linked jihadists tighten a siege around the capital, Bamako, by attacking fuel convoys and cutting off supplies to the city of four million.
The insurgents, operating under the banner of Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), have created a worsening crisis marked by electricity shortages, school closures, and fuel lines stretching across the capital.
With public anger rising and militant attacks increasing, diplomats warn the government could fall within days.
Days earlier, the group claimed its first known attack inside Nigeria, saying it killed a soldier in Kwara State and seized weapons and cash.
Africa’s Sahel region, comprised of Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad, Sudan, and Eritrea, is often referred to as the coup belt because so many governments have been overthrown by their militaries in recent years.
After each takeover, ties with Western governments such as the United States, France, and Britain were severed, and foreign counterinsurgency forces were expelled.
The withdrawal of international security support has created a vacuum in which Islamic extremist organizations have been able to flourish.
This is exactly what happened in Mali. In 2020, coup leader Assimi Goïta and his soldiers seized power, expelled foreign forces—including U.S. and French troops—and promised to tackle terrorist groups on their own.
In 2023, the United Nations Security Council approved the full withdrawal of its 15,000-strong peacekeeping mission after the junta demanded its departure.
Insurgency in the region has evolved through splits, mergers, and constantly shifting alliances among militant groups. One product of this landscape is Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), the Sahelian branch of al-Qaeda.
JNIM emerged from the merger of several jihadist factions and is overseen by al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), its immediate parent organization.
AQIM itself was formed from the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), which first established al-Qaida’s foothold in the Sahara and the Sahel.
Since its formation, JNIM has transformed from a loose coalition of local jihadist factions into a unified organization with a clear hierarchy consisting of central leadership, regional commanders, and local area commanders.
While many constituent factions still retain their individual identities, JNIM operates as a coordinated entity and maintains its allegiance to al-Qaeda.
JNIM employs a blend of guerrilla warfare and strategic violence, including suicide bombings, targeted assassinations, kidnappings, complex assaults, and large-scale military operations.
It also relies heavily on remote attacks using improvised explosive devices, land mines, rockets, and mortar fire.
Its targets have included infrastructure, military and security installations such as helicopter and drone bases, as well as government buildings, schools, telecommunications towers, power lines, and bridges.
JNIM also conducts a sustained media propaganda campaign, presenting itself as a defender of local populations against foreign forces and the corrupt, secular, and “anti-Islamic” governments it denounces as Western puppet regimes.
Its governing strategy is rooted in imposing its own interpretation of Islam, enforcing dress codes, gender segregation, and strict social controls.
The group commits mass atrocities against communities it accuses of supporting pro-government militias or the Islamic State Sahel Province.
To weaken state authority and create space for expansion, JNIM wages economic warfare through artisanal mining, livestock theft, extortion and collection of zakat, looting, taxation of goods, and tapping into both licit and illicit supply chains to fund its operations and assert control over local populations.
JNIM portrays itself as an umbrella organization capable of absorbing other militias, terrorist groups, and a wide range of ethnic communities, including Tuareg, Arab, Fulani, Songhai, and Bambara.
Its expansion has extended from northern and central Mali into the country’s western and southern regions, across the central Sahel, and into the West African littoral states. The group now operates in parts of Niger and the northernmost areas of Benin, Ghana, Ivory Coast, and Togo.
In Burkina Faso, JNIM exerts significant influence in 11 of the country’s 13 regions, making it the most militancy-affected nation in West Africa.
The country has also become the primary staging ground for JNIM operations in neighboring Benin, Ivory Coast, Ghana, and Togo.
The group has engaged in sustained military conflict with international, regional, and local forces, as well as non-state armed groups such as the pro-government Dan Na Ambassagou and Dozo (Donso) militias, along with communities aligned with them in central Mali. JNIM also frequently clashes with rival jihadist factions.
In particular, JNIM has repeatedly clashed with the Islamic State Sahel Province (IS Sahel), its main jihadist rival. According to ACLED data, JNIM is responsible for more than half of all violent incidents across the region.
Historically, the strongest opposition to JNIM’s expansion came from French forces and the U.N. peacekeeping mission in Mali (MINUSMA).
But with Western militaries now expelled, the junta has turned to Russia’s Wagner Group as its primary counterinsurgency partner.
Wagner has strengthened the Malian Armed Forces (FAMa) in some areas and assisted in retaking limited territory, but its overall effectiveness remains minimal.
JNIM has simply shifted operations into regions beyond the reach of FAMa and Wagner, allowing the insurgency to continue expanding.
JNIM remains the most active armed actor in the Sahel. The absence of a unified international counterinsurgency coalition, combined with recurring coups and political instability, has created ideal conditions for the group’s advance and for the erosion of state authority.
At the same time, conflict with the Islamic State Sahel Province (IS Sahel) has slowed JNIM’s momentum in some areas, though field reports suggest the two factions may have recently reached a local truce.
Regional governments have stepped up both ground and air operations against JNIM, but these efforts have done little to contain the group.
A full-scale conflict between JNIM and IS could fracture the jihadist landscape, yet this would only shift the threat rather than eliminate it.
For now, there is little indication that the crisis will improve. Civilian communities in contested areas, are expected to continue suffering as violence spreads and state authority weakens across the Sahel.
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